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Abstract— Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) attempts to find 
cryptographic protocols resistant to attacks using Shor’s polynomial 
time algorithm for numerical field problems or Grover’s search 
algorithm. A mostly overlooked but valuable line of solutions is 
provided by non-commutative algebraic structures, specifically 
canonical protocols that rely on one-way trapdoor functions (OWTF). 
Here we develop an evolved algebraic framework who could be 
applied to different asymmetric protocols. The (canonic) trapdoor 
one-way function here selected is a fortified version of the Triple 
decomposition Problem (TDP) developed by Kurt. The original 
protocol relies on two linear and one quadratic algebraic public 
equation. As quadratic equations are much more difficult to 
cryptanalyze, an Algebraic Span Attack (ASA) developed by Boaz 
Tsaban, focus on the linear ones. This seems to break our previous 
work. As countermeasure, we present here an Extended TDP (cited 
as XTDP in this work). The main point is that the original public 
linear equations are transformed into quadratic ones and the same is 
accomplished for exchanged tokens between the entities. All details 
not presented here, could be found at the cited references. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
 
2. ALGEBRAIC SPAN ATTACK (ASA) 
 
At time of publishing [6], we were not aware of the ASA 
attack developed by Tsaban and others [8]. It seems a fruitful 
way of cryptanalyzing non-commutative canonical protocols. 
As that paper declares, TDP is the only canonical protocol that 
is non-affected by earlier methods and that was also our own 
idea about it and the motivation to adopt it.  
ASA concentrates on a weak point of TDP. This protocol 
manages public keys in format of two linear equations with 
two unknowns each and a quadratic one with three unknowns. 
Tsaban paper exposes the strong point of ASA: quadratic 
equations may be very difficult to solve, so he targets the 
linear equations with algebraic spans.  
An obvious defense could be to extend TDP so that all 
public components are quadratic and that is the main point and 
purpose to present XTDP, an extension of the original 
framework. Further study will support the ASA resistance 
conjecture of XTDP or find an alternative way of 
cryptanalyzing it, perhaps by a new algebraic attack. 
 
3. TDP REVISITED. 
 
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a trend that has an 
official NIST status [1,2] and which aims to be resistant to 
quantum computers attacks like Shor [3] and Grover [4] 
algorithms. NIST initiated last year a process to solicit, 
evaluate, and standardize one or more quantum-resistant 
public-key cryptographic algorithms [1]. Particularly Shor 
algorithm provided a quantum way to break asymmetric 
protocols.  
Security of a canonical non-commutative protocol always 
relies his security on a one-way trapdoor function (OWTF) 
[5]. For instance, in an algebraic context, the conjugacy search 
problem, decomposition problem, double coset problem, 
triple decomposition problem, factorization search problem, 
commutator based or simultaneous conjugacy search 
problem. All are hard problems assumed to belong to AWPP 
time-complexity (but out of BQP), which yield convenient 
computational security against current quantum attacks.  
In a previous work [6], we developed a framework based 
on the GL(d, Fp), working with d-dimensional non-singular 
matrices of elements in Zp and presented a full solution of a 
KEM based on p=251 field and using Kurt’s TDP [5, 7]. More 
details could be consulted on that paper.  
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All details could be found at [5, 6, 7], but a short overview 
will help as an introduction to XTDP.  
The public platform is a monoid M with two separate sets 
of five subsets each affected by invertibility and 
commutativity restrictions. In our framework, all subsets 
belongs to GL(d, Fp), the general linear group. The two sets 
are defined as A and B and their subsets are: 
 
A : {A1, A2, A3, X1, X2} 
B : {B1, B2, B3, Y1, Y2} 
 
Subjected to following restrictions: 
 
(invertibility) {X1, X2, Y1, Y2} should be invertible. In 
our specific platform, all subsets are invertible.  
(commutativity) [A2,Y1]=[A3,Y2]=[B1,X1]=[B2,X2]=I in 
terms of group commutators. 
 
Alice and Bob agree on using respectively A and B. All 
lowercase variables are random non-biased selections of 
uppercase sets (i.e., ai E Ai). 
 The protocol goes as follows: 
 
(1) Alice chooses {a1, a2, a3, x1, x2}and computes: 
u=a1x1, v=x1
-1
a2x2, w=x2
-1
a3  
The private key is (a1, a2, a3) and the public key is (u, 
v, w). 
(2) Bob chooses {b1, b2, b3, y1, y2}and computes: 
p=b1y1, q=y1
-1
b2y2, r=y2
-1
b3 
The private key is (b1, b2, b3) and the public key is 
(p, q, r).  
(3) Both exchange public keys and compute the common 
key:  
(Alice) KA = a1pa2qa3r = a1b1a2b2a3b3 
(Bob) KB = ub1vb2wb3 = a1b1a2b2a3b3 
 
As could be verified, {u, w, p, r} are lineal equations and 
{v, q} are quadratic. ASA avoid attacking the non-linear 
equations and target the linear ones. 
 
4. XTDP. 
 
This protocol transforms TDP into a stronger one changing all 
linear public equations into quadratic ones in a mostly symmetric 
way. This feature enforces true TDP solving of each public piece 
to cryptanalyze it. As a drawback, in case of volatile or session 
public keys, it needs a double pass of public information. Aside 
from this not too disturbing disadvantage, the XTDP based 
framework could be a fast and secure way to obtain a canonical 
non-commutative PQC solution.  
The public platform is the general linear group GL(d, Fp) 
with two separate sets of seven disjoint subsets each affected 
by commutativity restrictions, as invertibility is a-priori 
assured. In our framework, the two sets are defined as A and 
B and their subsets are: 
 
A : {A1, A2, A3, X0, X1, X2, X3 } 
B : {B1, B2, B3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3} 
 
Subjected to following restrictions: 
 
(commutativity) 
[A1,Y0]=[A2,Y1]=[A3,Y2]=[B1,X1]=[B2,X2]=[B3,X3]=I in terms  
of group commutators.  
Alice and Bob agree on using respectively A and B. All 
lowercase variables are random non-biased selections of 
uppercase sets (i.e., ai E Ai). It is crucial to obtain IND-CCA2 
semantic security that all instances are randomly selected. 
 
(4) Alice chooses {a1, a2, a3, x0, x1, x2, x3}and computes: 
u=x0
-1
a1x1, v=x1
-1
a2x2, w=x2
-1
a3 x3  
The private key is (a1, a2, a3, x0, x1, x2, x3) and the 
public key is (u, v, w). 
(5) Bob chooses {b1, b2, b3, y0, y1, y2, y3}and computes: 
p=y0
-1
b1y1, q=y1
-1
b2y2, r=y2
-1
b3 y3 
The private key is (b1, b2, b3, y0, y1, y2, y3) and the 
public key is (p, q, r).  
(6) Both exchange public keys and compute the 
following tokens 
(Alice) tA = a1pa2qa3r =a1y0
-1
b1a2b2a3b3y3 = y0
-1
z y3 
(Bob) tB = ub1vb2wb3 = x0
-1
a1b1a2b2a3x3b3 = x0
-1
z x3 
 
 
where z= a1b1a2b2a3b3  
(7) Both exchange the tokens and compute the common 
key: 
(Alice) KA = x0 tB x3
-1
 
(Bob) KB = y0 tA y3
-1
 
 
Neither Alice, Bob or Mallory (an adversary) could 
obtain private key parts from the public ones unless 
they solve triple decomposition problem. 
(8) The computed session key could be used to cipher any 
matrix belonging to the Modular d-dimensional 
Matrix monoid (Md), using the Blind Conjugacy 
Search Problem (BCSP) as OWTF [6]: 
 
Computational BCSP: 
Given G, a non-abelian group with solvable word 
problem and given any element a e G, and an unknown 
element b e  G, find at least one element x e  G such 
that a = x-1 b  x. 
 
The described cryptosystem goes as: 
 
 ∈  
	 = 
  
 =   	 
 = 
= 
 
 =  
 
 
4. XTDP SAMPLE PROTOCOL 
 
TABLE I 
SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
PUBLIC SETUP STEPS 
 
 
 
 
 = 8,   –Modular matrix monoid, d=8 and prime=251   
8,   –General Linear Group  
⊂   – strictly included into 
∈  – belongs to 
∈  – uniform distribution, randomly selected element in 
∀≠  -  strictly positive and non-repeating elements in alist.  
  ,  , … – diagonal matrices of eigenvalues with ∀≠ property 
$ … $ – eigenvalues set, each one mentioned independent from others 
[a,b] – commutator (=a-1b-1ab) 
I – Identity matrix order 8 
Sel – selects or reserves for her/him with agreement of the other party. 
⟹    send publicly to the other entity 
Public 
parameters 
(any entity 
defines) 
 
Subgroups {A1,A2,A3,X1,X2} ⊂   
 
Subgroups {A1,A2,A3,X0,X1,X2,X3} ⊂  GL(8,ℤ) 
Subgroups {B1,B2,B3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3} ⊂ GL(8,ℤ) 
Eigenvectors O assigned to A1, Y0 ;  [A1,Y0]=I 
Eigenvectors P assigned to A2, Y1 ;  [A2,Y1]=I 
Eigenvectors Q assigned to A3, Y2 ;  [A3,Y2]=I 
Eigenvectors R assigned to B1, X1 ;  [B1,X1]=I 
Eigenvectors S assigned to B2, X2 ;  [B2,X2]=I 
Eigenvectors T assigned to B3, X3 ;  [B3,X3]=I 
 
Eigenvectors public matrices 
'(, ), *, +, ,, -. ∈  GL(8,ℤ) ⟹ 
 
 
TABLE III  
ADDITIONAL ENCRYPTION STEP (BCSP PROTECTED) 
 
PRIVATE PROCEDURES 
 
TABLE IV  
PRIVATE KEYS 
 
TABLE V  
PUBLIC KEYS 
 
TABLE VI  
TOKEN GENERATION 
commuting pairs are between brackets 
 
 
TABLE VI I 
COMMON SESSION KEY 
 
TABLE VIII  
ADDITIONAL ENCRYPTION STEP (BCSP PROTECTED) 
TABLE IX  
ALICE DECRYPTION STEP  
 
It is easy to apply the same framework to other asymmetric 
protocols. For example, defining power-sets of matrices, a 
straightforward ElGamal solution is at hand. Also, extending 
the GL() to a polynomial ring,  a Maze et al.  protocol could 
be implemented. Changing of purpose, a ZKP authentication 
protocol, a Baumslag et al. KEM (key encapsulation 
mechanism) or a Digital Signature is almost trivial to design. 
When powers of matrices are used new kind of weakness 
could appear, the multiplicative order of the elements should 
be sufficiently high to foil brute-force attacks. One could use 
companion matrices of primitive polynomials as generators of 
high order subgroups. Comparing different canonical 
approaches, the BCSP application of this framework offer a 
reasonable compromise solution between cryptographic 
security and fast computation.  
Supposing no other weakness at hand, full cracking a 
private key depends on four d-dimensional diagonal 
eigenvalues matrices, so a brute force search of the 
commutative P8 subgroups of M8 involves the cardinal 
 
|P8 |4 =24932 =4.77 x 1076
  ≈ 2255 
 
For a real-life application, we suggest to use at least P8  
or perhaps expanding the commutative subgroup to P16, 
who implies a 510-bit level classical security. The 
corresponding quantum security level is the respective 
square roots of the key space cardinals [7]. The obvious 
drawback is the corresponding increase in space, each 
matrix in {P8, P16} occupies respectively {512, 2048} bits. 
A corresponding computational session time should be 
expected.  
Against quantum-based attacks, the dimensional 
increase foils Grover like attacks and no multiplicative (or 
additive) cyclic order finding adaptation of Shor’s 
algorithm is known and accessible against the present 
protocol.   
Further arguments of the framework security are 
exposed in our previous work [6]. 
We designed XTDP to protect the framework against 
Tsaban’s ASA attack [8]. No formal proof is provided, but 
the presence of full quadratic public terms let us assume it.    
As a final consequence, we infer that our proposed 
framework could be gotten immune against brute-force 
attacks, linear representation attacks, length-based attacks 
and currently known quantum attacks.  
 
5. SEMANTIC SECURITY (IND-CCA2) 
 
The key point to assure semantic security is the 
indistinguishability of encrypted information from random 
one of same length [9]. 
  ALICE BOB 
Random 
private 
elements 
Sel {A1,A2,A3,X0,X1,X2,X3} 
∀≠ $ … $ ∈ ℤ
∗  
 = $ … $ 
 = $ … $ 
0 = $ … $ 
1 = $ … $ 
1 = $ … $ 
10 = $ … $ 
2 = (  ( 
2 = ) ) 
20 = *0 * 
34 ∈  GL(8, ℤ
∗ ) 
3 = +1 + 
3 = ,1 , 
30 = -10 - 
Sel {B1,B2,B3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3} 
∀≠ λ … λ ∈6 ℤ
∗  
d8 = λ … λ 
d8 = λ … λ 
d80 = λ … λ 
d94 = λ … λ 
d9 = λ … λ 
d9 = λ … λ 
: = + + 
: = ,  , 
:0 = -0 - 
;4 = (<4 ( 
; = )< ) 
; = *< * 
;0 ∈6 GL(8, ℤ
∗ ) 
  ALICE BOB 
Session 
set of 
Private 
keys 
2 , 2,  20, 34 , 3,  3,  30 :, :, :0, ;4 , ; , ;,  ;0 
  ALICE BOB 
Public 
keys: 
1st 
exchange 
= = 342 3 
v = xa  x 
A = 320  30 
(u, v, w) ⟹ 
B = ;4:  ;  
C = ; : ; 
D = ;:0  ;0  
(p, q, r) ⟹ 
  ALICE BOB 
Token: 
2nd 
exchange 
E = 2  p 2 C 20 D= 
[2;4 ] : [;2] ;
:. 
.  [;20] ;:0 ;0 = 
;4 I  ;0  ⟹ 
where 
z  =  2  : 2 : 20 :0 
E =  u : J : A :0 = 
342  3[: 3] 2 3. 
.[ : 3
] 20 [30:0] = 
34 I  30 ⟹ 
where 
z  =  2  : 2 : 20 :0 
  ALICE BOB 
Common 
session 
key 
 
KALICE = x0 tB x3-1 
 
KBOB = y0 tA y3
-1 
 
WXYZ = x0 E x3
−1 
= x034 I  30x3
−1  =  2  : 2  : 20 :0 
[ = y0 E y3−1 
= y0;4 I  ;0y3
−1 =   2 : 2 : 20 :0 
\]^_`a = \bcb ≡   \ 
  ALICE BOB 
BOB 
ciphers a 
message 
to 
ALICE 
 
 ∈  
	 = [
 [ 
	 ⟹ 
  ALICE BOB 
ALICE 
recovers 
the 
message 
 
= 
= WXYZ  	 WXYZ
 
 
 
 
 = WXYZ  	 WXYZ
 =
= WXYZ[
 [WXYZ
 =  
 
The presented framework is easily translatable to other 
asymmetric protocols. For this reason, the following security 
analysis is not limited to the present example and can be extended 
in new contexts. To proceed with this analysis, two conjectures 
are exposed. 
 
DEFINITION (D1): interactive challenge-response 
game by a verifier against an active adversary. 
In this three-phase protocol, two entities, an adversary and a 
verifier (or challenger) are involved. The verifier has a secret key 
that he tries to hide from the adversary and allows the adversary 
to pose questions to him that answers truthfully like an Oracle. In 
a first phase, the adversary can raise all the questions that he 
wants to try to obtain information about the secret key. In a 
second phase, the verifier presents the secret key (k) to the 
adversary next to another of equal length and format (* k) 
randomly generated. Even during the second phase, the adversary 
may continue to consult the verifier, except for questions linked 
to the disclosure of the secret itself. In the third phase, the 
adversary has a polynomial time stochastic algorithm and must 
distinguish whether the secret is k or * k, with probability 
negligibly greater than ½. If the opponent achieves the distinction 
with that probability, he wins the game and loses it in the opposite 
case. 
CONJECTURE (C1): Indistinguishability of product 
transformed random matrices. 
The elements of , e)  are uniformly random integers of 
prime modulus and d-dimension. It is a known fact that sum or 
multiplication between random field integers, does not introduce 
statistical bias into results.  Therefore, linear transformed 
matrices are statistically distributed as any random generated 
ones. The consequence is that in an interactive challenge-
response protocol (Definition D1), an adversary does not achieve 
the distinction raised with the required probability. 
 
CONJECTURE (C2): the present framework adheres 
to semantic security under IND-CCA2. 
The TDP one-way trapdoor function with which the private 
key is protected is, as previous exposed, not weakened by attacks 
of probabilistically polynomial time, whether classical or 
quantum that are in the public domain until today, forcing the 
potential attacker to perform a systematic exploration of the 
private key space (the diagonal matrices). Under this assumption 
and considering the indistinguishability of randomly generated 
matrices and enciphered ones, it is reasonable to assign to the 
framework a security mark equivalent to IND-CCA2 (semantic 
security under IND-CCA2) [9]. 
 
6. CONCLUSION. 
 
We developed a fortified and supposedly ASA [8] resistant 
version of our previous TDP framework. Evidence is provided to 
adhere to IND-CCA2 semantic security. 
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